内容简介

The discoveries of social choice theory have undermined the simple and unrealistic 19th century notions of democracy, especially the expectation that electoral institutions smoothly translate popular will directly into public policy. One response to these discoveries is to reject democracy out of hand. Another, which is the program of this book, is to save democracy by formulating more realistic expectations. Hence, this book first summarizes social choice theory in order to explain the full force of its critique. Then it explains, in terms of social choice theory, how politics and public issues change and develop. Finally, it reconciles democratic ideals with this new understanding of politics.

作品目录

1. The Connection Between the Theory of Social Choice and the Theory of
Democracy
The Attainability of Justice
The Elements of Democracy
The Meaning of Democracy
The Liberal Interpretation of Voting
The Populist Interpretation of Voting
Differences Between Liberal and Populist Interpretations of Voting
The Vitality of the Liberal and Populist Interpretations of Voting
The Paradox of Voting
2. Difference Choices from Identical Values
Evidence from Elections
Evidence from Experiment
3. Simple Majority Decision
Introductory Definitions
Properties of Simple Majority Decision: Monotonicity
Violations of Monotonicity
Properties of Simple Majority Decision: Undifferentiatedness (Anonymity)
Properties of Simple Majority Decision: Neutrality
Simple Majority Decision and Fairness
Democratic Thought About Simple Majority Decision
4. Voting Methods with Three or More Alternatives
Some Preliminaries
Majoritarian Methods of Voting
Examples of Majoritarian Methods
Positional Methods of Voting
Examples of Positional Methods
Utilitarian Methods of Voting
Examples of Utilitarian Methods
Criteria for Judging Voting Methods
Judgments on Voting Methods
The Absence of True and Fair Amalgamations
5. The Meaning of Social Choices
Arrow's Theorem
The Practical Relevance of Arrow's Theorem: The Frequency of Cycles
The Practical Relevance of Arrow's Theorem: Conditions for Condorcet Winners
The Theoretical Invulnerability of Arrow's Theorem: Independence
The Theoretical Invulnerability of Arrow's Theorem: Transitivity
The Theoretical Invulnerability of Arrow's Theorem: Conditions on Social
Choice
The Absence of Meaning
6. The Manipulation of Social Choices: Strategic Voting
The Elements of Manipulation
The Universality of Strategic Voting
Examples of Strategic Voting
The Consequences of Strategic Voting
Vote-trading
The Ineradicability of Strategic Voting
7. The Manipulation of Social Choices: Control of the Agenda
The Universality of Agenda Control
Examples of Agenda Control
The Paucity of Equilibria
Practical Stability and Theoretical Instability
The Fragility of Equilibria: An Example of the Introduction of New Alternatives
to Generate Disequilibrium
8. The Natural Selection of Political Issues: An Interpretation of Political
Disequilibrium
Disappointments with Disequilibria
Voting Disequilibrium: What It Means to Lose
Voting Disequilibrium: The Quantity and Quality of Political Dissatisfaction
The Consequences of Dissatisfaction: A Model of Political Change
The Natural Selection of Issues
Structural Regularities in Natural Selection
9. Manipulation and the Natural Selection of Issues: The Development of the
Issue of Slavery as a Prelude to the American Civil War
The Appearance of Slavery as a National Political Issue
Slavery as an Issue from the Ratification of the Constitution Through the
Missouri Compromise
From the Missouri Compromise to the Gag Rule
The Wilmot Proviso
From the Wilmot Proviso to the Civil War
10. Liberalism, Populism, and the Theory of Social Choice
The Adequacy of Voting
The Rejection of Populism
The Survival of Liberalism and Democracy
Are Liberal and Populist Interpretations Compatible?
The Preservation of Liberal Democracy
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